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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 The Commissioner of Social Security appeals the District 
Court’s order remanding this case after an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) denied Kacee Chandler’s claims for Social Security 
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI).  We will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court. 
I 
 Kacee Chandler is a mother of two with a GED and two 
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years of business school education.  In 2006, she developed 
reflexive sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) after she fell.  At the 
time, she was a bookkeeper and part-time receptionist for a law 
firm, as well as a housecleaner.  Chandler worked full-time until 
January 2007, but by October 2007 she had reduced her hours to 
three per day, five days per week.  She stopped working 
altogether in April 2008. 
Chandler filed for DIB and SSI in October 2007, but her 
application was denied in June 2008.  In June 2009, Chandler 
received a hearing before the ALJ, who denied her  applications 
at Steps Four and Five, finding that she was not disabled 
because she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to 
perform sedentary work with certain limitations and that jobs 
meeting those criteria were available.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1520, 404.1545(a), 416.920; see also Hartranft v. Apfel, 
181 F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining RFC as ―that 
which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations 
caused by his or her impairment(s)‖ (citing 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1545(a))).  Eight months later, the Appeals Council 
denied Chandler’s request for review of the ALJ determination, 
making it the Commissioner’s final decision.  In May 2010, 
Chandler sought review in the District Court.  The District Court 
held that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by 
substantial evidence, and the Commissioner appealed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 
405(g) and 1383(c)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over legal conclusions 
reached by the Commissioner.  See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the 
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Commissioner’s factual findings for ―substantial evidence,‖ 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g), which is ―such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.‖  Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts are not 
permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual 
determinations.  See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. 
III 
  Consistent with her burden to produce evidence 
supporting her disability claim, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; 
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2005), 
Chandler presented numerous medical records describing 
treatments and evaluations between January 2006 and May 
2009.  The records detailed her RSD diagnosis and the 
placement and revision of a spinal cord stimulator to help 
control her pain.  Chandler’s records also indicated a 
dependency on prescription painkillers for years after her injury. 
 Finally, the record contained several opinions and notations by 
medical professionals regarding Chandler’s disability. 
In September 2007, nurse practitioner Lisa DeWees 
wrote that Chandler was ―permanently disabled‖ but that she 
could still work at a ―very low physical stress job‖ twenty to 
twenty-five hours per week.  In April 2009, DeWees also noted 
that Chandler ―cannot work and earn money in any capacity due 
to her . . . [RSD] . . . and cannot sit, stand, or walk for greater 
than 30 minutes at a time.‖ 
State agency psychologist Dr. Karen Weitzner opined on 
June 25, 2008, that Chandler had an ―adjustment disorder‖ but 
5 
 
that it did not satisfy the regulations’ diagnostic criteria and was 
not a severe impairment; it only mildly limited her social 
functioning and concentration and did not impede her daily 
activities. 
On July 1, 2008, State agency medical consultant Dr. 
Vrajlal Popat issued a Physical Residual Functional Capacity 
Assessment after reviewing Chandler’s medical records through 
June 2008.  He acknowledged, among other things, that 
Chandler had ―pain which [was a] sharp, stabbing ice pick 
sensation,‖ and confirmed that ―the medical evidence 
establishe[d] a medically determinable impairment of [RSD].‖  
Ultimately, Dr. Popat concluded that Chandler retained the 
ability to occasionally lift or carry ten pounds, climb stairs, 
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and that she had no 
manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental 
limitations. 
After the ALJ’s decision, Chandler submitted to the 
Appeals Council two additional opinions: one from DeWees’s 
colleague, Dr. Christopher Echterling, and one from her former 
supervisor at the law firm, N. Christopher Menges.  Dr. 
Echterling simply ―concur[red]‖ with DeWees’s April 2009 
diagnosis.  Menges explained Chandler’s poor concentration and 
accuracy in the workplace after her injury. 
IV 
The District Court rejected the ALJ’s decision because 
―there was no timely and relevant opinion by a medical expert 
which support[ed] the [RFC] determination.‖  Chandler v. 
Astrue, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 19 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 
2011).  Essential to this holding was the District Court’s 
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rejection of Dr. Popat’s report as no longer useful to the ALJ 
determination because Dr. Popat had only reviewed the medical 
records through June 2008.  As we shall explain, the District 
Court committed legal error in disregarding Dr. Popat’s report.1 
Preliminarily, we must distinguish between the new 
records and DeWees’s April 2009 notes, which arose after Dr. 
Popat’s report but before the ALJ’s decision, and the opinions of 
Dr. Echterling and Menges, which were never before the ALJ.  
As to the latter, remand cannot be justified based on the ALJ’s 
failure to consider those documents.  ―[A]lthough evidence 
considered by the Appeals Council is part of the administrative 
record on appeal, it cannot be considered by the District Court in 
making its substantial evidence review . . . .‖  Matthews v. Apfel, 
239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).  Moreover, remand based on 
new evidence is only appropriate where the claimant shows 
good cause why that evidence was not procured or presented 
before the ALJ’s decision, id. at 594, and Chandler has failed to 
do so here because she has not explained ―why she did not 
attempt to obtain [the] evaluation[s] at a time when [they] could 
be considered by the ALJ,‖ id. at 595. 
With respect to the records arising after Dr. Popat’s 
                                                 
1 
 The District Court also noted that Dr. Weitzner ―only 
reviewed the medical records through June 25, 2008.‖  
Chandler, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 16.  Although 
Chandler has not focused her appeal on the ALJ’s Step Two 
determination that her depression was not severe, for the reasons 
explained herein, this was no basis for discrediting Dr. 
Weitzner’s report, which provided substantial evidence for the 
ALJ’s determination. 
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review but before the ALJ’s decision, a few salient points 
emerge.  First, the records presented to the ALJ in this case 
were, at most, a few years old.  They tracked Chandler’s injury 
and deterioration during the time periods surrounding her 
disability onset date.
2
  We have permitted reliance on records 
much older than those presented in this case.  See, e.g., Morales 
v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding a 1997 
ALJ decision based on records from 1989 through 1994); 
Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360–61 (finding substantial evidence 
where the ALJ relied on six-year-old medical records). 
Second, because state agency review precedes ALJ 
review, there is always some time lapse between the consultant’s 
report and the ALJ hearing and decision.  The Social Security 
regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass 
between a report and the ALJ’s decision in reliance on it.  Only 
where ―additional medical evidence is received that in the 
opinion of the [ALJ] . . . may change the State agency 
medical . . . consultant’s finding that the impairment(s) is not 
equivalent in severity to any impairment in the Listing,‖ is an 
update to the report required.  SSR 96-6p (July 2, 1996) 
(emphasis added).  The ALJ reached no such conclusion in this 
case.
3
 
                                                 
2 
 Chandler revised her disability onset date several times. 
 In her original disability application, Chandler alleged an onset 
date of January 2006.  In proceedings before the ALJ, she 
amended it to January 2007.  Finally, in her request to the 
Appeals Council, she revised her onset date to January 2008. 
 
3 
  Although the District Court found that the ALJ’s 
explanation for its Step Three determination that Chandler’s 
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Contrary to the District Court’s view, the ALJ was 
entitled to rely on Dr. Popat’s opinion.  The ALJ—not treating 
or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must 
make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.  See 20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c).  Although treating and 
examining physician opinions often deserve more weight than 
the opinions of doctors who review records, see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1527(d)(1)–(2), ―[t]he law is clear . . . that the opinion of a 
treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of 
functional capacity,‖ Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  State agent opinions merit significant consideration 
as well.  See SSR 96-6p (―Because State agency medical and 
psychological consultants . . . are experts in the Social Security 
disability programs, . . . 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 
416.927(f) require [ALJs]  . . . to consider their findings of fact 
                                                                                                             
impairments did not match or equal a listing was ―inadequate,‖ 
Chandler, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 17, it clearly stated that 
its remand was based primarily on the ―lack of substantial 
evidence supporting the [ALJ’s] [RFC] assessment,‖ 
Memorandum Pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 3.1 at 4, 
Chandler, No. 4:10-cv-01047 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2011). 
Moreover, Chandler does not argue that her new records 
or DeWees’s additional notes would have altered the ALJ’s or 
Dr. Popat’s decisions at Step Three.  She contends that ―it is 
likely, if not expected that the opinions proffered by Dr. 
Echterling would have a substantial effect on the outcome of the 
disability determination,‖ but, as explained above, neither the 
District Court nor this Court may consider Dr. Echterling’s 
opinion with respect to whether the ALJ had substantial 
evidence to deny Chandler’s application. 
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about the nature and severity of an individual’s 
impairment(s) . . . .‖). 
We also note that the ALJ did not merely rubber stamp 
Dr. Popat’s RFC conclusion.  Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1)(i) 
(clarifying that the RFC findings of non-examining State agency 
consultants are ―based on the evidence . . . but are not in 
themselves evidence‖).  Instead, the ALJ found persuasive and 
incorporated DeWees’s opinion that Chandler cannot sit for 
more than thirty minutes at a time, even though the ALJ was not 
required to consider DeWees’s opinion at all because, as a nurse 
practitioner, she is not an ―acceptable medical source[].‖  See 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1513(a).  The ALJ also added restrictions Dr. 
Popat did not deem necessary.
4
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  The ALJ’s complete RFC finding was: 
 
[T]he claimant has the residual functional 
capacity to perform sedentary work . . . except 
that the claimant is limited to standing and 
walking for 15 minutes at a time and no more 
tha[n] 2 hours per day.  The claimant is able to sit 
for 6 hours in an 8 hour day.  The claimant needs 
to be able to sit/stand/walk at will.  She is limited 
to lifting and carrying 5 pounds frequently and 10 
pounds occasionally.  She has no limitation on 
pushing and pulling up to 10 pounds.  She is 
precluded from using foot controls with her right 
foot.  She has no limitation on foot controls with 
her left foot.  She has no limitation on overhead 
reaching, bending or manipulation.  The claimant 
is precluded from climbing, balancing, crawling, 
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The District Court also suggested that the ALJ’s 
explanation in support of its decision was insufficient for 
meaningful review.  We disagree that the ALJ failed in this 
respect.  An ALJ must explain the weight given to physician 
opinions and the degree to which a claimant’s testimony is 
credited.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii); Rutherford, 399 
F.3d at 557.  The ALJ’s six-page ―Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law‖ detailed Chandler’s medical history and 
the state agency opinions.  The ALJ explained that he gave 
―significant weight‖ to Dr. Popat’s opinion and that, other than 
DeWees’s opinion, ―there [we]re no other treating or examining 
medical source statements which addressed the claimant’s 
physical capabilities.‖  The ALJ explained that he ―considered 
and evaluated‖ DeWees’s opinion even though it purported to 
make the ultimate disability determination, which is reserved to 
the Commissioner.
5
  The ALJ also explained why he discredited 
some of Chandler’s testimony. 
Chandler argues that ―error occurred when the ALJ 
                                                                                                             
using vibrating tools, unprotected heights and 
hazardous conditions.  She is limited to 
occasional stooping, kneeling and crouching.  
Due to her use of pain medication, she is limited 
to simple 1-2 step repetitive tasks without a high 
pace or production quotas. 
 
5 
 Although the ALJ’s findings only noted DeWees’s 
September 2007 opinion that Chandler was ―permanently 
disabled‖ but could still work twenty to twenty-five hours per 
week at a ―very low physical stress job,‖ the sit/stand limitation 
in the RFC demonstrates that the ALJ factored in DeWees’s 
April 2009 opinion as well. 
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reviewed or, more properly stated, ignored, the intervening 
developments in the record and, applying his own lay opinion, 
extrapolated from the medical opinion he obtained one year 
previous, from Dr. Popat, and determined that Chandler 
continued to have a virtually identical RFC.‖  The District Court 
likewise concluded that the ALJ had reached its decision based 
on its own improper lay opinion regarding medical evidence.  
But the ALJ is not precluded from reaching RFC determinations 
without outside medical expert review of each fact incorporated 
into the decision.  Although reliance on State consultants’ and 
treating physicians’ opinions is common and ALJs are required 
to consider any existing State consultant reports, see 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1519, 404.1527(f), the regulations do not require ALJs to 
seek outside expert assistance, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 
404.1527(e); SSR 96-5p (July 2, 1996).  Therefore, the ALJ did 
not err in this regard. 
V 
Having found that Dr. Popat’s report was properly 
considered by the ALJ, we readily conclude that the ALJ’s 
decision was supported by substantial evidence for the reasons 
we have stated.  The new medical evidence generated after Dr. 
Popat’s review did not undermine his conclusion.  Chandler’s 
September 2008 Progress Note says: ―[H]er foot pain has 
improved.  They gave her a new antenna for her spinal cord 
stimulator and things have improved. . . . She really feels 
comfortable with her medications at this time and does not want 
to change anything. . . . She has stopped smoking marijuana.‖  
Just before the ALJ hearing, in May 2009, Chandler’s fentanyl 
patch was ―tak[ing] the edge off,‖ and ―she [was] able to do her 
activities of daily living.‖  Chandler was experiencing some new 
hand pain but was able to ―use a computer frequently.‖ 
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Nor did Chandler’s own subjective complaints of pain 
and limitations cast doubt on Dr. Popat’s report.  Although ―any 
statements of the individual concerning his or her symptoms 
must be carefully considered,‖ SSR 96-7p (July 2, 1996), the 
ALJ is not required to credit them, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). 
 Chandler had reported extreme pain to doctors and claimed that 
she had to lie down most of the day, but she also testified that 
she managed to shop several times per week, cook dinner, care 
for her two children, and visit with friends.  The ALJ thus had 
substantial evidence to conclude Chandler was not ―credible 
regarding the intensity and extent of her limitations, especially 
her need to lie down most of the day due to pain,‖ and was 
entitled to rely instead on Dr. Popat’s opinion. 
VI 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s judgment and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
